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The Cooperation Provisions of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime: 
A ‘Toolbox’ rarely used?  
 
Abstract 
This article examines the provisions for international cooperation in the UN Convention and 
Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and their effectiveness in achieving the UNTOC’s goal 
of promoting effective cooperation in the prevention and combating of transnational organised 
crime. It is a response to the growing sense that the UNTOC is not as effective a tool as promised, 
which sense is exacerbated by the absence of a functional review mechanism for the UNTOC. The 
article notes the delimitation of the scope of the UNTOC based on organised crime groups that 
participate in serious transnational crime. It then goes on to describe the UNTOC’s provisions for 
informal law enforcement cooperation, mutual legal assistance, international cooperation in asset 
recovery and extradition, and examines what little evidence there is of the implementation of these 
provisions. It concludes that the UNTOC appears to be have been more successful as a tool for 
promoting informal rather than formal cooperation, and speculates as to why this may be so.  
 
 
by Neil Boister 
 
1. Introduction 
The UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime1 (Palermo Convention, UNTOC or 
UNCTOC) adopted in Palermo in 2000, enjoys almost universal subscription by States. As at May 
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1 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature 15 November 2000, 
2225 UNTS 209, in force 29 September 2003. See generally the contributions to H. Albrecht and C. Fijnaut. eds., The 
Containment of Transnational Organised Crime: Comments on the UN Convention of December 2000, (Freiburg im 
Breisgau: Edition Iuscrim, 2002);  the contributions to S. Betti, ed., Symposium The United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime: requirements for effective implementation (Turin: UNICRI et al, 2002); R.S. 
Clark, ‘The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime’, 50 Wayne Law Review (2004) 161;  
C.D. Guymon, ‘International Legal Mechanisms for Combating Transnational Organised Crime’ 18 Berkeley Journal 
of International Law (2000) 53; M. Joutsen, ‘International Cooperation against Transnational Organized Crime: 
Criminalizing Participation in and Organized Criminal Group’, 59 UNAFEI Resource Materials (2002) 417; D. 
McClean, Transnational Organized Crime: A Commentary on the UN Convention and its Protocols (Oxford: Oxford 
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2015 it has 185 States parties.2 Its explicit goal as spelled out in article 1 is to ‘promote co-
operation to prevent and combat transnational organised crime more effectively’. A complex of 
articles delimits the scope of the UNTOC on the basis of what is an organised criminal group, a 
serious crime, a transnational crime, and then the UNTOC obliges States parties to criminalise 
participation in an organised criminal group, money laundering, corruption and obstructing justice. 
Much of the academic literature on the UNTOC is devoted to exploring this criminalisation 
dimension.3 The great bulk of the convention is devoted to the procedural matters of international 
cooperation against this transnational organised crime. This procedural dimension, which ranges 
from informal police cooperation to formal legal assistance, is so elaborate that its very detail 
suggests that international cooperation rather than criminalisation is in fact the main subject matter 
of the UNTOC. The focus of this article is on this framework of rules for cooperation. It is driven 
by the sense that these rules are under-utilised and that fifteen years after its adoption the UNTOC’s 
aims of promoting co-operation to prevent and combat transnational organised crime more 
effectively have not been fully realised. Participants in a conference held in 2010 which focussed 
in part on the performance of the UNTOC considered it disappointing. 4  The 2015 Doha 
Declaration on Integrating Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice into the wide UN Agenda calls 
on States parties ‘to implement and make more effective use of’ the UNTOC.5 These implicit 
doubts should be seen in the context of a general perception that the crime suppression conventions 
have as Dandurand and Chin note ‘not yielded their expected dividends in terms of effective 
 
University Press, 2007); T. Obokata, Transnational Organised Crime in International Law (Oxford: Hart, 2010), pp. 
25-80; A. Orlova and J. Moore, ‘ “Umbrellas” or “Building Blocks”?: Defining International Terrorism and 
Transnational Organised Crime in International Law’, 27 Houston Journal of International Law (2005) 267; A. 
Schloenhardt,  ‘Transnational Organised Crime’ in N. Boister and R. Currie, eds., The Routledge Handbook of 
Transnational Criminal Law (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 409; D. Vlassis, ‘The United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols: A New Era in International Cooperation’, in The Changing Face of 
International Criminal Law (Vancouver, BC: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice, 
2002) p. 75. 
2  United Nations Treaty Collection, Status, as at 28 May 2015 available at 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=ind&mtdsg_no=xviii-12&chapter=18&lang=en>. 
3 See, for example, N. Boister, ‘The UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime’  in P. Hauck and S. 
Peterke, eds, International Law And Transnational Organized Crime (Oxford: OUP, forthcoming 2016). 
4 André Standing, rapporteur, “Transnational Organized Crime and the Palermo Convention: A Reality Check,” 
New York: International Peace Institute, December 2010, 9-12, available at 
file:///C:/Users/nboister/Downloads/Transnational%20Organized%20Crime%20and%20the%20Palermo%20Conve
ntion.pdf.  
5 The declaration on integrating crime prevention and criminal justice into the wider United Nations agenda to address 
social and economic challenges and to promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and public 
participation, adopted at the 13th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 12 -19 April 2015, Doha; 
UN Doc A/CONF.222/L.6, 31 March 2015. 
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international co-operation’.6 The aim of this article is to examine the framework for international 
cooperation set out in the UNTOC and then to examine the scant evidence of how it is being used 
in practice so as to assess as far as possible how these cooperation provisions within the UNTOC 
are being used in cooperation against transnational organised crime. 
 
2. The Concept of Organised Crime in the UNTOC and its relation to the Provisions for 
International Cooperation  
First, a brief explanation of the concept of organised crime embodied in the UNTOC is called for, 
because it is from this peg that the provisions for cooperation hang. Despite enthusiasm from some 
delegations for a model that would describe the sociological nature of organised crime and the 
typical activities organised criminals engaged in, the authors of the UNTOC were unable to reach 
agreement on a definition of organised crime. They settled instead on a scheme that defined the 
scope of the UNTOC using three elements. 7  First, an ‘organized criminal group’ (OCG) defined 
in article 2(a) of the UNTOC as:  
 
 a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting 
 in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences 
 established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or 
 indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.  
 
Such a group must be ‘structured’ but according to article 2(c) only in the very limited sense ‘that 
[it] is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence’; it ‘does not need to have 
formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure’. 
The second element, provided for in article 2(b), defines ‘serious crimes’ as ‘conduct constituting 
an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious 
penalty’. The third element, provided for in article 3(2), defines what makes an offence 
‘transnational’ for the purposes of the UNTOC:  if,  
 
6 Y. Dandurand and V. Chin, ‘Implementation of Transnational Criminal Law’ in N. Boister and R. Currie, eds., The 
Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal Law (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 437, p. 441. 
7 See UNODC, Travaux Préparatoires of the Negotiations for the Elaboration of the United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto, New York: United Nations, 2006, UN Pub. Sales 




(a) It is committed in more than one State; 
(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction 
or control takes place in another State; 
(c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in 
criminal activities in more than one State; or 
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State. 
 
These three elements come together in article 3(1), entitled ‘Scope of Application’: 
 
1. This Convention shall apply, except as otherwise stated herein, to the prevention, 
investigation and prosecution of: 
(a) The offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention; 
and 
(b) Serious crime as defined in article 2 of this Convention; 
where the offence is transnational in nature and involves an organized criminal 
group. 
 
Under article 3(1)(a) the UNTOC applies to the ‘prevention, investigation and prosecution of’ the 
specific organisational and logistical offences of participation in an organised criminal group as 
defined in article 5, money laundering as defined in article 6, corruption as defined in article 8 and 
obstructing justice as defined in article 23 (in some of these definitions the OCG, serious crime 
and transnational elements play a definitional role). It also applies to the offences in the UNTOC’s 
three Protocols, the Human Trafficking Protocol,8 Migrant Smuggling Protocol9 and Firearms 
Protocol10 in virtue not of article 3(1) but through provision in the protocols themselves.11  Finally, 
 
8 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, New York, 15 November 2000, 2237 UNTS 319, 
in force 25 December 2003. 
9 Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, New York, 15 November 2000, 2241 UNTS 507, in force 28 January 2004.  
10  Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and 
Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, New York, 31 
May 2001, 2326 UNTS 208, in force 3 June 2005. 
11 See, for example, Article 3(1) of the Human Trafficking Protocol. 
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under article 3(1)(b) the UNTOC applies to all residual serious crimes (as determined by the parties 
themselves simply by making the maximum punishment more than four years deprivation of 
liberty) when the offence is transnational and involves an OCG. Article 15 also makes provision 
for the jurisdiction to prosecute and punish such crimes through mandatory provisions basing 
jurisdiction on territoriality and ship and aircraft jurisdiction and permissive provisions based on 
passive personality, nationality, residence of a stateless person, jurisdiction in observance of the 
aut dedere aut judicare principle, and jurisdiction where the offences involves extra-territorial 
participation in an OCG or money-laundering, with a view to committing an intra-territorial 
serious crime. Taken as a whole, the UNTOC’s criminalisation scheme focuses on the nature of 
the group (in a very limited way), and on the cross border nature of their activities (in a very 
broadly drawn sense), but not on the specific kinds of crimes they engage in. In this respect, as 
Clark memorably puts it, the UNTOC is largely ‘specific content free’.12 The net outcome is a 
remarkably flexible instrument with a very low threshold set of conditions for its operation in the 
‘prevention, investigation and prosecution of the UNTOC’s specific crimes and serious crimes.  
This is not surprising because although the idea of a treaty against transnational organised crime 
was supported by developing states as a more accountable way of responding to transnational 
organised crime while the UNTOC was initially greeted with scepticism by the WEOG States, 
once the UNTOC’s development had begun the latter took the opportunity to multi-lateralise a 
range of existing regional and bilateral measures developed for international cooperation.13 The 
evidence suggests that they were far more interested in pursuing the development of a ‘tool box’ 
on modes of international cooperation than in reaching agreement on the conceptual issue of 
defining transnational organised crime. As Orlova and Moore record:  
 
according to the chief Canadian negotiator of the Palermo Convention, Keith Morrill, 
defining organized crime in the Convention was really a secondary issue. The primary 
concentration was on working out the "co-operation provisions" of the Convention (that is, 
extradition, mutual legal assistance and police co-operation). In other words, what was 
hoped would be accomplished was not a convention that provides a comprehensive 
definition of organized crime, but rather a convention that serves as a "tool box" to enable 
 
12 See Clark, op. cit., p.169.    
13 See Vlassis, op. cit., pp.79-80. 
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the functioning of various "co-operation provisions." Thus, the definition of an organized 
criminal group, contained in Article 2, alongside other provisions of the Convention, serves 
the utilitarian purpose of accommodating the provisions dealing with extradition, mutual 
legal assistance and police co-operation. 14 
 
 Cooperation is necessary because as article 4(2) makes clear, the States parties to the 
UNTOC agree that sovereignty forbids the unilateral use by one State party of its law enforcement 
authority in another.15 The UNTOC contains the ‘minimum’16 procedural framework to be used to 
enable cooperation in regard to the UNTOC and Protocol offences. Some of these measures are to 
be implemented at the national level and some to enable international cooperation. The UNTOC 
expanded upon established means of international cooperation such as extradition and mutual legal 
assistance to a greater number of parties and introduced informal direct law enforcement 
cooperation and special investigative techniques. Language was included in these provisions 
specifically to make it possible to establish the involvement of an organised criminal group and 
the transnationality of its activities – the triggers for the application of this cooperation regime.17 
Although these provisions reflect the assumptions of what was possible in law enforcement at the 
time,18 they did simplify the requirements for cooperation considerably. Verbruggen, comparing 
the UNTOC offences to the standard metal containers used in global trade, sums up the potential 
impact of the use of the container offences designed around the OCG’s on the furnishing of 
international cooperation: 
 
One can put the most varied issues in those standardised metal boxes: easy transport is 
guaranteed all over the globe. … the boxes will match, however heterogenous their content. 
In a similar way “container offences” derive their criminality from a link with other 
offences which can be quite heterogenous. The advantage is clear: double criminality, a 
 
14 See Orlova and Moore, op. cit., p. 285 (footnotes omitted). 
15 This neutralizes the argument accepted in United States v Alvarez Machain, 504 US 655 (1992), that rendition is 
legal unless expressly forbidden.  See O. Lagodny, ‘Implementation of the Convention: The Sovereignty Issue’ in 
Albrecht and Finjnaut, eds., op. cit., pp. 165-6.   
16 M. Mackarel, ‘Procedural Aspects of the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime‘ in Albrecht and 
Fijnaut, eds., op. cit., p. 145, p. 147. 
17 Vlassis, op. cit., p. 96. 
18 M.E. Beare, ‘Shifting Boundaries – between States, Enforcement Agencies, and Priorities‘ in Albrecht and Fijnaut, 
eds., op. cit., p. 171. 
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classical requirement in international cooperation against transnational crime is no longer 
an issue. Instead of harmonising all the different predicate offences, it is enough to 
standardise the boxes.19 
 
He also points out the obvious drawbacks: ‘since the boxes are closed, it becomes harder to control 
what they really contain.’20 The inherent proportionality between the seriousness of the basic 
offence and level of cooperation offered by a requested State party is placed at risk, because 
cooperation becomes conditional on matching extremely flexible organisational or logistical 
offences. Is the mutual trust necessary for cooperation a victim as some assert? 21  While a 
comprehensive survey of the UNTOC’s international cooperation provisions is impossible here, 
some sense of what it provides is given below. However, before doing so it is useful to point out 
the provisions for implementation in the UNTOC, as they set the context for examination of States 
parties’ implementation of these cooperation elements. 
 
3. Provisions for Implementation 
In terms of article 34(1) the States parties are required to take the necessary measures, including 
legislative and administrative measures, in accordance with the fundamental principles of their 
domestic law, to ensure implementation. Provision is made in article 30(2)(b) for States parties to 
enhance their financial and material support for implementation by developed States, while article 
30(2)(c) provides for technical assistance. Contributions have been made,22  but there are always 
calls for more assistance.23 Whether States parties are in fact taking the necessary measures to 
implement the procedural provisions in the UNTOC remains an open question because the main 
follow-up mechanism for implementation provided by article 32, the Conference of the Parties 
(COP), while  injuncted to periodically review the implementation of the UNTOC, has failed to 
adopt a review mechanism. Regular discussion of the adoption of this mechanism since its first 
 
19 F. Verbruggen, ‘On Containing Organized Crime Using “Container Offences”: Some Reflections on Substantive 
Criminal Law Issues in, Albrecht and Fijnaut, eds., op. cit., p. 113, pp. 129-130. 
20 Verbruggen, op. cit., p.130.  
21 F. Calderoni, “A Definition that Does not Work: The Impact of the EU Framework Decision on the Fight against 
Organized Crime’, 49 Common Market Law Review (2012), p. 1365, p. 1390. 
22 In the period 2013 to 2014, the US gave $27.2 million to the UNODC in technical assistance to fight transnational 
organized crime Vienna, UNCCPCJ, Wednesday 20 May 2015 (notes on file with the author). 
23 The African group at the 2015 UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (UN CCPCJ) called for 
more technical assistance to fight the evolving nature of transnational organized crime.Vienna, Monday 18 May 2015 
(notes on file with the author). 
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session held in 2004 has not produced the unanimity required for a decision with budgetary 
implications 24  because States parties, having been exposed to the operation of the review 
mechanisms for other crime suppression conventions, fear the potential financial25  or human 
resources26 costs of the system. Exhortations from the UN General Assembly in Resolution 67/189 
of 20 December 2012 to actively engage in endeavouring to agree such a mechanism27 has as yet 
not produced any fruit. Concern about performance is also reflected in the statement of regional 
organisations28 and the complaints within the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice (UN CCPCJ) about shortcomings in implementation.29  The pith of these concerns is 
revealed in the statements by the Mexican delegate that ‘transnational challenges require collective 
action by all States….pretending to do so benefits no one’30 and by the US delegate that ‘[w]e do 
not have a shortage of conventions, what we have is a gap in their implementation.’31 It is difficult 
to assay the accuracy of these sentiments because we only have patchy information on the 
implementation of the UNTOC’s international cooperation provisions. Undaunted, let us turn now 
to the nature of these provisions, and what little information there is on their implementation.  
 
4. International Police Cooperation 
Earlier crime suppression conventions such as the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention focussed 
on international legal cooperation but not on police cooperation.32 Article 27(1) of the UNTOC in 
contrast takes a broad approach encompassing all forms of cooperation. It establishes a general 
obligation on States parties to ‘enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement action’ against the 
UNTOC offences. It obliges them to adopt effective measures such as improving channels of 
communication between law enforcement agencies. Research indicates that more informal cultures 
 
24 Rule 58 of the COP’s Rules of Procedure require unanimity in making such a decision. 
25 Vienna, UNCCPCJ, Tuesday 21 May– statements by Canada, Norway, and Austria (notes on file with the author). 
26 Vienna, UNCCPCJ, Wednesday 20 May 2015 (notes on file with the author). 
27 UN Doc A/RES/67/189*, 20 December 2012. 
28  See for example, OSCE Decision non 5/06 on Organised Crime, MC/DEC.5/06, 5 December 2006; OAS 
Hemispheric Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by the Permanent Council through 
resolution CP/RES. 908 (1567/06) in 2006. 
29 Asia Pacific Group, Latin American Group, EU all complained in this regard at the UNCCPCJ 18 May 2015 (notes 
on file with the author). 
30 UNCCPCJ 18 May 2015 (notes on file with the author).. 
31 UNCCPCJ, 18 May 2015. The French were of much the same opinion, UNCCPCJ 20 May 2015 (notes on file with 
the author). 
32 Albrecht, ‘Introduction’, in Albrecht and Fijnaut, eds., op. cit., p. 16. 
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of cooperation are likely to be more rewarding.33 It suggests that police to police requests for help 
are essential for success in practical terms and the mutual legal assistance serves merely to formally 
legalize this process.34 Anecdotal evidence also suggests that simple knowledge of another State’s 
system (in its entirety) is crucial to successful cooperation.35 Article 27(1)(b) provides for the 
expansion in the scope of cooperation in the conduct of specific inquiries relating to ‘offences 
covered by’ the UNTOC, which must be taken to include serious crimes. It provides inter alia for 
duties to furnish requesting States parties with information on the modus operandi used by 
organised criminal groups and the tracking and tracing of suspects, the proceeds of crime, and 
property used in crime. Article 27(2) urges them to adopt complementary measures to enhance this 
cooperation.  
 Article 28 requires States parties to collect and share information on trends in organized 
crime. Initial attempts by Europol and Interpol to quantify the number of groups in each country 
engaged in organized crime were abandoned when it became clear that there was no common 
methodology for identifying them and their fluid nature made collecting information difficult. The 
emphasis has shifted to collecting information about the activities that these groups take part in, 
which is more in line with the view of organised crime as networks for facilitating criminal 
activity.36  
 In regard to more specific policing measures, article 19 provides for the creation of joint 
investigation teams either by specific agreement or on an ad hoc basis while article 20 provides 
for special investigative techniques such as electronic surveillance and controlled delivery. Article 
26 provides for the use of undercover operations and informers. These provisions are simple 
frameworks; they do not provide detailed regulation of how to engage in these practices.37 States 
are left to their own devices. Provision is made in the UNTOC for training and technical assistance 
in this regard.38  
 
33 M.E. Beare, ‘Shifting Boundaries – between States, Enforcement Agencies, and Priorities‘ in Albrecht and Fijnaut, 
eds., op. cit., p. 171, p. 189. 
34 Ibid. 
35 R. Ciaffa, ‘The Palermo Convention and International Cooperation between Police Forces‘ in Betti, ed., op. cit., p. 
79, p. 80. 
36 See J. van Dijk and T. Spapens, ‘Transnational Organized Crime Networks Across the World‘ in J. Albanese and 
P. Reichel, eds., Transnational Organized Crime, A View from Six Continents (Los Angeles etc.: Sage, 2014),  p. 7, 
p. 11.  
37 Mackarel, op. cit., p. 153. 
38 Art. 29. 
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 No consolidated information exists as to either the levels of law enforcement cooperation 
afforded or the use of special investigative techniques at a global level under the auspices of the 
UNTOC. The UNODC has collected examples of cases of law enforcement cooperation in the case 
law database of its SHERLOC portal (Sharing Electronic Resources and Laws on Crime).39 These 
78 cases40 show a pattern similar to that in more formal forms of legal and judicial assistance (see 
further below): the participation of police forces mainly from WEOG states but with increasing 
involvement from law enforcement agencies in GRULAC and Eastern European States, and 
significant powers in the other regions. The UNTOC usually only frames the assistance provided; 
it is commonly based on regional and bilateral treaties or MOUs or cooperation through Interpol. 
The forms of assistance include the full range of activities anticipated by the UNTOC – joint 
investigations, electronic surveillance, and under-cover operations, in addition to direct exchange 
of investigative information. The targets are criminals involved in the full range of offences within 
the scope of the UNTOC as well as other serious transnational offences. Other sources indicate 
that there has been quite dramatic progress in Europe in the institutional development of 
international law enforcement cooperation against transnational organized crime.41 Progress has 
also occurred globally. Shortly after the adoption of the UNTOC a rise in law enforcement 
cooperation against transnational organised crime was illustrated by the arrests of Russian OCGS 
in Italy, investigations in Bank of New York cases and detentions in France.42 The establishment 
of the Commission for the Investigation of Clandestine Security Organisation (CICIACS) in 
Guatemala, indicated similar enforcement activity in Central America. 43 In Africa, information is 
sparse though the use of techniques is spreading. For example, in a 2010 case which runs against 
the general trend of high level West African officials cooperating with drug traffickers rather than 
foreign law enforcement, cocaine dealers who met with Liberian Security Agency directors with 
the intention of bribing them discovered that the directors were actually working with the US DEA 
 
39 See UNODC, SHERLOC, http://www.unodc.org/cld/index-sherloc.jspx. 
40 Available specifically at http://www.unodc.org/cld/search-sherloc-
cld.jspx?&f=caseLaw.crossCuttingIssues.internationalCooperation.measures.measure_s%3AInternational%5C+law
%5C+enforcement%5C+cooperation%5C+%5C%28including%5C+INTERPOL%5C%29. 
41 See C. Fijnaut, ‘European Union Organized Crime Control Policies’ in L. Paoli, ed., The Oxford Handbook of 
Organized Crime (Oxford: OUP, 2014), pp. 574 et seq. 
42 B. Zagaris, ‘Arrests in Europe indicate Progress in Russian Transnational Crime Investigations’, 18(8) International 
Law Enforcement Reporter (2002) 324-5. 
43 B. Zagaris, ‘UN and Guatemala form Unit to Prosecute attacks against Human Rights Groups’, 20(4) International 
Law Enforcement Reporter (2004) 149. 
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in an undercover operation.44 When the UNTOC was adopted it was feared that its emphasis 
UNTOC on more expansive forms of cooperation would foster a transnational cooperation 
increasingly dominated by the police and in which the judiciary are being marginalised.45 There 
are indications to suggest that the UNTOC is playing a role in fostering trust among law 
enforcement agents, if only by encouraging direct contact and a broader view of what is possible. 
Whether this is at the expense of judicial control of criminal processes generally is not clear, 
although there are isolated examples that suggest it is.46  
 
 
5. Modes of International Legal or Judicial Cooperation 
 
5.1 The Framework for Mutual Legal/Judicial Assistance 
Article 18 of the UNTOC, a very detailed mini mutual legal assistance treaty in its own right, 
frames mutual assistance under the UNTOC. It is an attempt to overcome the problems of 
longwindness and obstructive formality inherent in rogatory processes that require the use of the 
diplomatic channel to funnel requests for assistance and the use of foreign courts to supervise and 
authenticate the taking of evidence.47 It tries to do so among a large group of States parties that do 
not have extant legal assistance arrangements of a more direct and informal kind.  
 Article 18(1) obliges States Parties to afford each other ‘the widest measure of mutual legal 
assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings’ in relation to the offences 
‘covered by this Convention as provided for in article 3’. These offences must thus include 
domestically defined ‘serious crimes’ in addition to the organisational and logistical offences the 
UNTOC creates. The States parties must reciprocally extend to one another similar assistance 
where the requesting State party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the offence ‘is transnational 
in nature, including that victims, witnesses, proceeds, instrumentalities or evidence of such 
offences are located in the requested State party and that the offence involves an organized criminal 
 
44 B. Zagaris, ‘US and Liberia Undercover Sting against International Narcotics Trafficking Yields Dividends’, 26(8) 
International Law Enforcement Reporter (2010) 304. 
45 Albrecht, op. cit., pp. 17-18 and sources cited there. 
46 See, for example, N. Boister, ‘Law Enforcement Cooperation between New Zealand and the United States: Serving 
the Internet ‘Pirate’ Kim Dotcom up on a ‘Silver Platter’?’ in S. Hufnagel and C. McCartney, eds., Trust in 
International Police and Justice Cooperation, (Oxford: Hart, forthcoming). 




group.’  This partial application of the UNTOC’s requirement of transnationality allows for 
assistance to be provided in the early phases of investigations when the evidentiary basis of the 
commission of an offence covered by the Convention and its Protocols may still be weak. It also 
provides for an enlarged notion of transnationality of the offence. 48 
 Article 18(3) provides for an obligation to afford assistance in regard to a range of different 
purposes in taking evidence abroad including taking statements, service of judicial documents, 
search and seizure, providing information and evidence, tracing the process of crime and 
facilitating the appearance of witnesses. It contains guidelines as to the form the request should 
take in article 18(15) but only touches on conditions for legal assistance. For example, in regard 
to double criminality article 18(9) provides that the requested State may provide assistance ‘to the 
extent it decides at its discretion, irrespective of whether the conduct would constitute an offence 
under the domestic law of the requested State Party.’ The fiscal matters objection is specifically 
restricted by article 18 (22) and so too is bank secrecy through article 18(8) so neither cans serve 
as a barrier to rendering assistance. To make the process of requesting these forms of assistance as 
efficient as possible article 18(13) requires the States parties to designate a Central Authority with 
the power and authority to receive requests and either execute them or transmit them to the 
competent authority. In terms of article 18(15) the Authority must ‘ensure the speedy and proper 
execution or transmission of the requests received.’  
 Execution of requests for assistance follow the law of the requested State on the principle 
locus regit actum and follows the procedures it insists upon (which may inevitably cause problems 
of reception of the evidence if rules of evidence and procedure of the requesting State have not 
been adhered to). Article 18(17) does allow for execution following the law of the requesting State, 
where such a procedure is specified in the request and is not contrary to the law of the requested 
State.  Article 18(18) of the UNTOC provides for the use of video links so long as it is consistent 
with the fundamental law of the requested State Party, but like many of the UNTOC’s procedural 
provisions leaves it to further international arrangement to detail the process. In a procedure which 
appears to stand outside of the normal process, article 18(4) also provides for unsolicited 
transmission of material when the competent authority of the transmitting State Party believes the 
material could be of assistance in law enforcement.  
 
48 The notion of serious crime in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Note by the 
Secretariat. UN Doc CTOC/COP/2012/CRP.4, 20 September 2012, paragraph 15. 
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 Article 18 thus provides a set of minimum standards for mutual legal assistance. It does 
not eliminate the material and procedural obstacles that mutual legal assistance faces,49 because it 
does not compel major changes in domestic law and practice. But it does provide in article 18(6) 
for complementary mechanisms to be developed, and more exacting instruments have been 
developed at the regional level in Europe, for example. One way to streamline legal assistance is 
to transfer proceedings, provision for which is made in article 21. 
 
5.2 International Cooperation in Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime 
One specific area of elaborate development in mutual legal assistance in the UNTOC is the 
reinforcement of the provision made in article 12 for the seizure and confiscation of criminal 
proceeds, by processes spelled out in article 13 for international cooperation in confiscation 
matters. It requires a requested State party to take particular measures to identify, trace and freeze 
or seize proceeds of crime for purposes of eventual confiscation, and describes how such requests 
are to be drafted, submitted and executed. Finally article 14 provides for disposal of the confiscated 
assets in accordance with domestic law, but calls upon the disposing party to give priority to 
requests from other States parties for the return of such assets for use as compensation to crime 




Article 16(1) provides that article 16’s provisions relating to extradition shall apply to the offences 
‘covered by’ the UNTOC, which again must include the UNTOC offences and serious crimes. 
However, it confusingly also applies  
 
in cases where an offence referred to in article 3, paragraph 1 (a) or (b), involves an 
organized criminal group and the person who is the subject of the request for extradition is 
located in the territory of the requested State Party, provided that the offence for which 
extradition is sought is punishable under the domestic law of both the requesting State Party 
and the requested State Party.  
 
 
49 Gless, op. cit., p. 142. 
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Article 16(1) thus applies the general condition of double criminality, the presence of the accused 
and involvement of an organised criminal group to the very same UNTOC offences and serious 
crimes.50 But the condition of transnationality of the offence, as described in article 3(2) is partly 
lifted in the sense that article 16 only requires the presence of the accused on the territory of the 
requested state (which may have involved them crossing borders). Ultimately extradition under 
the UNTOC depends on (a) participation of an OCG in serious crimes as measured by the penalty 
threshold and (b) on the collective nature of the participation in these crimes. The consequences 
of the application of article 16 are spelled out in article 16(3), which includes the UNTOC offences 
and serious crimes as extraditable offences in any extant extradition treaties between the States 
parties with a promise to incorporate them in new treaties, and in article 16(4), which provides that 
the UNTOC itself may serve as ‘the legal basis for extradition in respect of any offence to which 
this article applies’. In terms of article 16(5) they must inform the Secretary General if they choose 
to do so upon ratification or accession, and while many States have indicated that they will do so51 
others have indicated they will not.52 The majority remain silent, possibly because they may be 
able to do so on the basis of their legislation but do not want to commit themselves, or because 
they will insist on reciprocity. The particulars of and conditions for extradition, apart from the 
discrimination clause and nationality exceptions, are left to States parties. Article 16(10) is an 
extradite or prosecute obligation where State Party’s national is alleged to have committed an 
offence and it refuses on the basis of their nationality to extradite him, although it only requires 
submission of the case for prosecution without undue delay, it does not insist that prosecution must 
ensue. Supplementing extradition, article 17 provides for the transfer of prisoners. 
 
5.4 Implementation of Legal Assistance and Extradition 
The key challenge in the provision of international cooperation for States parties that otherwise do 
not enjoy bilateral relations that enable legal assistance or extradition, is to try to use the UNTOC 
 
50 McClean, op. cit., p. 177, notes this is ‘frankly puzzling’. 
51 Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,  Estonia, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau,  Holy See, Italy, Jamaica, India, 
Kazakhstan,  Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia (FRY), Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Moldova, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland,  Romania, Russian 
Federation, Sao Tome and Principe, Slovakia, Slovenia, St Vincent, Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Venezuela – see Status of Ratification, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/signatures.html. 
52 Botswana, Burundi, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, St Lucia, United States, Yemen– see Status of 
Ratification, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/signatures.html..  
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itself for this purpose, so as to avoid the necessity of the continual updating these bilateral relations 
require. Information in this regard is, in the absence of the institution of a formal implementation 
review mechanism by the UNTOC COP, difficult to obtain. However, the UNTOC COP in its 
third session charged the secretariat with gathering data concerning their reliance on the UNTOC 
to effect extradition, mutual legal assistance and other forms of international legal cooperation. 
The data gathered in 200853 and 201054 (which was supplemented55) reveals some interesting 
features of this cooperation.  
Those States parties that were not prepared to grant assistance gave varied reasons for 
declining to do so most of which pertained to their inability to rely on a multilateral treaty for 
provision of assistance.      
 
State Form of Assistance Crime Reason for refusal 
Venezuela (r.Lithuania) extradition n.a. Grounds not intrinsic 
to UNTOC 
Botswana (r. Montenegro) extradition n.a. Requires bilateral 
treaty or  membership 
of Commonwealth 
Scheme for Rendition 
Burkina Faso n.a. n.a. Lack of awareness in 
national jurisdiction 
Kuwait (r. Lithuania) extradition OCG, others Kuwait did not accept 
UNTOC as basis for 
extradition 
Paraguay (r. various) Extradition,  confiscation n.a.  Paraguay did not 




53 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, fourth 
session, 8-17 October 2008: Catalogue of examples of cases of extradition, mutual legal assistance and other forms of 
international legal cooperation requested on the basis of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, UN Doc CTOC/COP/2008/CRP.2, 17 September 2008, available at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/COP2008/COP-2008-CRP2.pdf  
54 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, fifth 
session, 18-22 October 2010: Catalogue of Cases involving extradition, mutual legal assistance and other forms of 
international legal cooperation requested on the basis of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, UN Doc CTOC/COP/2010/CRP.5, 22 September 2010, available at  
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/COP5/CTOC_COP_2010_CRP5/CTOC_COP_2010_C
RP5_E.pdf 
55 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, fifth 
session, 18-22 October 2010: Catalogue of Cases involving extradition, mutual legal assistance and other forms of 
international legal cooperation requested on the basis of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 





Many States parties in strong regional systems such as the EU reported that they relied entirely on 
these regional arrangements when working within the region, while others such as Norway, 
Sweden and Switzerland did not require a convention for legal assistance so did not need the 
UNTOC. There were also a number of cases where requests were sent and no reply received, where 
States parties had no means of gathering the information requested (Belgium, Germany) or had 
not yet ratified (the UK).  
The data for those States that were prepared to offer assistance is best represented in tabular 
form broken into the UN’s regional groupings (I have omitted incomplete requests or requests 





Legal Basis Form of Assistance Crime 
Morocco (r. Netherlands) UNTOC extradition murder by an OCG 
Cape Verde (r. Spain) UNTOC  extradition drug trafficking 





Legal Basis Form of Assistance Crime 
Philippines/ 17 identified 
states 
UNTOC, bilateral and 
regional instrs. 
MLA n.a. 
Philippines (r. 7 states) UNTOC, bilateral and 
regional instrs. 
extradition n.a. 
Lebanon (r. Spain) UNTOC MLA terrorism 
China (r. U.K.) UNTOC MLA tax fraud, money 
laundering 









Eastern European Group 
State (requested/ 
requesting) 
Legal Basis Form of Assistance Crime 
Estonia (3 x r. US) UNTOC, bilateral, 
Budapest Convention 
extradition computer related 
fraud 
Poland UNTOC transfer of proceedings drug trafficking 









Ukraine (r. Lebanon) UNTOC MLA n.a. 
 





Legal Basis Form of Assistance Crime 
Mexico (r. Brazil) 
(r. Costa Rica) 











(r. Italy)  
(r. Belgium)  
(r. Netherlands)  
(r. Switzerland) 
(r. France) 
62 other cases 
 





UNTOC, bilateral and 
regional instrs. 
 
MLA, confiscation  



















Uruguay UNTOC MLA OCG, drugs 
Colombia (r. not clear) UNTOC confiscation n.a. 
















































Argentina (r. various 
States) 
UNTOC, regional and 
bilateral instrs. 
MLA human trafficking, 
UNTOC offences 
Panama (r. Costa Rica) UNTOC MLA money laundering 
Nicaragua (r. Costa Rica) UNTOC MLA human trafficking 














Western European and Others Group (WEOG) 
State (requested/ 
requesting) 
Legal Basis Form of Assistance Crime 
Monaco (r. Brazil) UNTOC, domestic law extradition fraud  
corruption 
US (r Egypt) UNTOC, bilateral treaty MLA online fraud, identity 
theft 
Canada (r. various States) 
 
(r. Slovenia) 
(r. New Zealand) 
UNTOC when no extant 
bilateral 
UNTOC 









U.K. (r. Mauritius) 
(r. Costa Rica) 
(r. China) 









Spain (r. Serbia) UNTOC confiscation OCG, corruption 
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(r. Costa Rica) 
(r. Brazil) 
(r Brazil) 

























































Turkey (r. Ukraine) UNTOC, regional instrs. MLA human trafficking, 
OCG  
Netherlands (r. U.A.E.) 






murder by an OCG 












Norway (r. Brazil) UNTOC MLA money laundering 
 
Unidentified requested State 
State (requested/ 
requesting) 
Legal Basis Form of Assistance Crime 
23 unidentified states (r. 
Brazil) 
UNTOC, domestic law MLA, confiscation money laundering 
10 unidentified states (r. 
US) 
UNTOC extradition, MLA Fraud,  
weapons trafficking 
 
The data in these tables is by no means comprehensive but it does give a flavour of the activity 
undertaken. Generally the table suggests fairly consistent activity in the Western hemisphere and 
Europe with a negligible activity occurring elsewhere, which is unsurprising given that the 
UNTOC although driven by developing states initially had begun by the end of negotiations to be 
viewed somewhat sceptically by developed states as a vehicle for expensive obligations potentially 
intrusive on their sovereignty.56  This is unfortunate given that for States without developed 
regional and bilateral relations the UNTOC presents the only option as the basis for international 
cooperation. 
It also indicates some differences in regard to the legal basis on which States parties offered 
assistance. Some were prepared to do so on the basis of the UNTOC alone, some on the UNTOC 
 
56 Vlassis, op. cit., pp. 90-1. 
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in conjunction with domestic legislation and some on the UNTOC in conjunction with other 
regional extradition or specific crime suppression treaties or bilateral extradition treaties (these 
States usually gave the impression in their reports that these other treaties played a more significant 
role in providing that platform).  
The reports indicate that there were more requests for MLA than extradition. MLA is in 
practice usually a precedent to the extradition, it’s usually cheaper, and it’s less administratively 
burdensome or likely to engage as much judicial supervision.  
In regard to the types of crime for which assistance was offered, there was negligible 
assistance offered for participation in an organised criminal group criminalised under article 5 of 
the UNTOC and nothing in regard to obstruction of justice which is criminalised under article 23 
of the UNTOC. There was a great deal of activity around money laundering criminalised under 
article 6 of the UNTOC and human trafficking criminalised in the Human Trafficking Protocol,  
and some activity in regard to corruption criminalised under article 8 of the UNTOC. There was 
little explicit preparedness to grant assistance specifically citing the provision for ‘serious’ crimes 
as defined using the four year or more punishment threshold set out in article 2(b) of the UNTOC, 
although there was a significant number of cases of assistance for drug trafficking and some cases 
of fraud, and a smattering of other crimes, many of which probably qualified as serious crimes. 
 What the reports show as a whole is that while the UNTOC has been used as the sole or 
partial basis for international cooperation either through MLA or extradition for certain rather 
typical forms of transnational crime, it appears to be generally perceived as a fall-back mechanism 
mainly for MLA requests for (probably) serious transnational crimes although not crimes 
specifically targeting OCGs. Most legal assistance requests are still made on a regional or bilateral 
basis. While the numbers of bilateral treaties and the frequency of requests by States parties 
appears to be increasing,57 it is not clear to what extent the UNTOC frames progress of this kind 
in state practice or whether it makes any difference at all.  
One can only speculate as to why the UNTOC had not by 2010 had as greater an impact 
on mutual legal assistance and extradition in regard to a broader range of crimes. One reason is 
obviously that some States had not yet become party. Some States parties may not have reformed 
 
57 South Korea, for example, has adopted 76 extradition treaties and 72 mutual legal assistance treaties and while in 
2005 it only handled 5 extradition and 33 mutual legal assistance requests by 2014 it was dealing with 45 extradition 
and 181 mutual legal assistance requests - UNCCPCJ, 18 May 2014 (notes on file with the author). 
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their domestic law to make it compatible with the obligations under the UNTOC or the use of the 
UNTOC as a platform of cooperation. They may not have adopted the institutional architecture to 
enable effective cooperation.58 A further reason for non-reliance on UNTOC may have been 
concerns about human rights when potentially opening up the Pandora’s box of cooperation with 
so many States parties. States reluctant to sign bilateral treaties with non-parties to the ICCPCR 
because of wariness of harsh penalty regimes,59 may not have been as prudent when signing the 
UNTOC and wake up to discover they are in a legal cooperation relationship with a State with a 
questionable human rights record. Albrecht noted in 2002 that ‘globalized responses to global 
threats carry also the risk of triggering the strong state and safety and security models, which put 
the focus on efficiency in crime and violence control to the disadvantage of human rights and the 
rule of law.’60 The Expert Group which drafted much of the UNTOC did suggest incorporation of 
‘appropriate safeguards for the protection of human rights and to ensure compatibility with 
fundamental national legal principles.’61 However, while the Protocols do have specific human 
rights protections built into them,62 the UNTOC itself does not. Even though the UNTOC is being 
used as an extradition or legal assistance treaty it does not have the specific protection of human 
rights usually found in an extradition or legal assistance treaty. It may be to counter this omission 
that more recently regional organisations and groupings like the EU and GRULAC have called at 
the UNCCPCJ for respect for human rights and input from civil society in action against 
transnational organised crime.63  
There is a paucity of more recent information about implementation of the UNTOC’s legal 
assistance provisions. One exemplary rather than comprehensive source is the UNODC’s 
 
58 See, for example, D. E. Stigall, ‘Countering Convergence: “Central Authorities” and the Global Network to Combat 
Transnational Crime and Terrorism’ (2015) Small Wars Journal available at 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/countering-convergence-%E2%80%9Ccentral-authorities%E2%80%9D-and-
the-global-network-to-combat-transnational.  
59 See, for example, B. Zagaris, ‘Proposed France-China Extradition Treaty Raises Human Rights Issues’, 23(3) 
International Law Enforcement Reporter (2007) 96; B. Zagaris, “PRC Promotes Negotiation of Extradition Treaties’, 
23(8) International Law Enforcement Reporter (2007) 296.  
60 Albrecht, op. cit., p. 1, p. 2. 
61 Travaux preparatoires, op. cit., p. xxiii. 
62 See for example article 2 of the Human Trafficking Protocol. 
63 UNCCPCJ, Wednesday 20 May, 2015, (notes on file with author). 
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SHERLOC case law data-base. For example, it lists ten cases in which the UNTOC was directly 
referred to as the basis for cooperation.64 
 
States involved Legal Basis Form of Assistance Crime 
Italy, Japan, Switzerland UNTOC, a wide range of 
multilateral and regional 
treaties 




UNTOC MLA OCG, drug 
trafficking 
Kenya, Netherlands, UK UNTOC MLA OCG, drug 
trafficking 
Italy, Romania UNTOC MLA OCG, migrant 
smuggling 
Serbia, Belgium, Sweden, 
Brazil, Italy, Argentina, 
Poland, Netherlands, 
South Africa, Montenegro 
UNTOC, bilateral 
treaties, UN Drug 
Trafficking Convention 
MLA, extradition OCG, drug 
trafficking 
Romania, Colombia UNTOC extradition money laundering, 
tax avoidance, 
forgery 




UNTOC MLA, asset recovery money laundering 
Serbia, Hungary, Austria UNTOC, regional treaty MLA OCG, migrant 
smuggling 
Serbia, US UNTOC, bilateral treaty MLA OCG, money 
laundering 
 
This list tends to suggest activity by the WEOG States and Eastern European States is usually 
based on regional or bilateral instruments; when it involves a State from other regions in the world 
the UNTOC can be used directly. The nature of the cooperation usually involves some form of 
mutual legal assistance or the use of cooperation in asset recovery; extradition is rare. The crimes 
are all transnational and involve membership of an OCG or money laundering, with a smattering 
of other trafficking and smuggling offences.   When compared to the 26 cases in the list relating 
to cooperation in regard to extradition65 the features of which are tabulated below, where the 
UNTOC was usually only indirectly implicated because of the nature of the offence involved, 
similar patterns of State practice emerge.  
 
64 See specifically http://www.unodc.org/cld/search-sherloc-
cld.jspx?&f=caseLaw.crossCuttingIssues.internationalCooperation.legalBasis.treaty_s%3AConvention%5C+against
%5C+Transnational%5C+Organized%5C+Crime. 






States involved Legal Basis Form of Assistance Crime 
Spain (r. Portugal) 
Brazil (r. Portugal) 
UNTOC, regional treaty MLA OCG, drug 
trafficking 
US, South Africa  n.a. extradition cyber fraud 
Canada, Australia, 
Thailand, Philippines 
n.a.  MLA, extradition,  migrant smuggling 
Italy, France, Spain, 
Germany, Luxembourg 
n.a. MLA, extradition, , asset 
recovery 
OCG, trafficking in 
cultural artefacts, 
money laundering 
UK, Spain, France n.a. extradition OCG, drug 
trafficking, asset 
recovery 
US, Ukraine, Switzerland bilateral agreements MLA, extradition,  OCG, money 
laundering, asset 
recovery 
Serbia, Belgium, Sweden, 
Brazil, Italy, Argentina, 
Poland, Netherlands, 
South Africa, Montenegro 
regional treaties, UN 
Drug Trafficking 
Convention 
MLA, extradition OCG, drug 
trafficking 






regional treaties MLA, extradition OCG, drug 
trafficking 
Italy, Serbia, Austria, 
Slovenia, Germany, 
Montenegro 
n.a. MLA, extradition, asst 
recovery 
OCG, drug 
trafficking, crimes of 
violence 
Italy, Belgium, Norway, 
France, Lithuania, 
Germany, Netherlands 








Romania, Colombia UNTOC extradition money laundering, 
tax avoidance, 
forgery 
Morocco, Italy  n.a. extradition drug trafficking 
Colombia, Venezuela, US n.a. MLA, extradtion OCG, drug 
trafficking 
Venezuela, Switzerland, 
Spain, China, Germany, 
Italy, Panama, US, 
Colombia 
n.a. MLA, extradition OCG, money 
laundering 
Norway, Nigeria n.a. extradition OCG, human 
trafficking 
Austria, Sweden n.a. extradition OCG, migrant 
smuggling 
Australia, Malaysia n.a. extradition migrant smuggling 
Australia, Indonesia n.a. extradition migrant smuggling 
Indonesia, Australia n.a. extradition Migrant smuggling 
Colombia, US n.a. extradition OCG, drug 




US, Romania, Latvia n.a. MLA, extradition OCG, cybercrimes 
US, Spain n.a. extradition money laundering 
US, Hungary n.a. MLA, extradition OCG, money 
laundering, fraud 
US, Netherlands n.a. extradition OCG, cybercrimes 
Australia, Thailand n.a. extradition migrant smuggling 
 
The most activity involves WEOG member States. Eastern European, Asia-Pacific and GRULAC 
States also show increased activity while Africa is represented only by its three most powerful 
economies. The legal basis for cooperation in most of these cases is not made clear but it is 
probably reliant on regional or bilateral treaties. The offences are a range of common transnational 
crimes many of which are defined in the UNTOC.  SHERLOC also lists 61 cases in which the 
UNTOC was implicated in some fashion in mutual legal assistance and 27 in international 
cooperation in asset recovery, where similar patterns of activity are evident. Most of this activity 
is framed by the UNTOC rather than directly reliant on it. Overall the incidence of the use of the 
UNTOC as the sole basis for extradition and mutual legal assistance still appears to be low.66 Some 
States parties have become increasingly reliant on it. China, for example, has not noted that it has 
dealt with more than fifty assistance requests from other parties under the UNTOC in the period 
2003-15 and considered the UNTOC the ‘leading platform’ for such assistance.67  
Greater efforts are going into the implementation of the UNTOC. Capacity building, 
mutual legal assistance and the other modes of cooperation have not been implemented in many 
States parties in Asia and the muted engagement of major players such as India suggests that 
regional responses are far from developing, and sovereignty concerns dominate.68 The UNODC 
has recognised that criminal justice systems in the Middle East and North Africa are vulnerable to 
organized crime because inter alia they are under-resourced.69 There has been some intervention, 
particularly at the regional level, with the long term goal being a network of networks. For example, 
the US and France funded the West African Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors 
against Organised Crime (WACAP) through the UNODC, as a strategy for the implementation of 
 
66 Statement by Panama at UNCCPCJ, Wednesday 20 May 2015 (notes on file with author). 
67 UNCCPCJ, Wednesday 20 May 2015 (notes on file with author). 
68 See R. Broadhurst and N. Farrelly, ‘Organized Crime “Control” in Asia: Experiences from India, China and the 
Golden Triangle’ in L Paoli, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime (Oxford: OUP, 2014), p. 634, pp. 649.  





the UNTOC.70 At a more general level, the massive activity against terrorism post 9/11 tended to 
overshadow enthusiasm for action against transnational organized crime for at least a decade. In 
2010 President Obama used executive orders to impose sanctions on named Transnational 
Criminal Organizations, signalling something of a cross pollination of approaches from terrorism, 
but also a renewed enthusiasm to attack transnational organised crime through public diplomacy.71 
The US President’s 2011 Transnational Organised crime Strategy records the US’s intention to 
‘leverage all possible areas of cooperation, including legal instruments such as the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention) … to obtain the assistance of 
international partners…’.72 It continues: 
 
The key challenge remaining is to promote wider implementation of the Conventions 
through support for capacity building and by otherwise encouraging international partners 
to dedicate the necessary political capital and resources toward realizing the potential of 
these groundbreaking instruments.73 
 
In 2012 the US, for example, began a still ongoing attempt to use the UNTOC directly to extradite 
the alleged cybercriminal Kim Dotcom from New Zealand to the United States to face copyright 
infringement and racketeering, and money laundering charges, crimes not listed in the 1970 
extradition treaty between the two States,74 but something enabled by the recognition in section 
101B(1) of the New Zealand Extradition Act 1999 of participation in an OCG committing srious 




70 See, UNODC Website, http://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/newrosenwebsite/criminal-justice-
system/wacap.html. 
71  B. Zagaris, ‘Obama Executive Order Imposes Sanctions on Transnational Organised Crime Groups’, 27(10) 
International Law Enforcement Reporter (2011) 925-7. 
72  US President’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, July 2011, 26, available at 
file:///H:/My%20Documents/Research%20-%20ongoing/TCL/Materials/TOC/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_
Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf. 
73 Ibid., p. 28. 
74 US - New Zealand Extradition Treaty,12 January 1970, TIAS 7035, 22 UST 1; in force 8 December 1970. 
75 United States district Court for the Eastern district of Virginia versus Kim Dotcom, Megaupload Limited, Vestor 
Limited, Finn Batato, Julius Bencko, Sven Echternach, Mathias Ortmann, Andrus Nomm, and Bram Van Der Kolk, 




The UNTOC does not establish a Procrustean system, forcing a range of different forms of 
organisation of criminal behaviour into a single definition of organised crime. Indeed, its material 
scope is remarkably capacious – it can in principle serve as a vehicle for international cooperation 
in regard to all kinds of serious crimes where there is a cross border element. But the ad hoc (and 
obviously limited) evidence of its performance in the promotion of cooperation examined here 
suggests that were a mutual review system successfully adopted by the UNTOC COP it would 
expose significant global gaps in its implementation. When law enforcement officials from one 
State approach another the UNTOC can provide a useful framework to engage in international 
cooperation, and there are indications it is being used for this purpose. However, when the 
approach requires legal assistance or extradition the record is less impressive. In these situations 
if the requesting State is one with which it enjoys strong relations it can use the UNTOC to frame 
cooperation based on existing bilateral or regional treaty relations or in absence thereof try to rely 
on the UNTOC itself. If the State is one with which it usually has little to do and has no other 
extant relations it may try to rely on the UNTOC itself but the prospect of success is dimmer. 
While there does not appear to be any legal reason why a multilateral treaty such as the UNTOC 
can serve to either frame cooperation or as the basis for cooperation, for many States the prospect 
of actually being required to cooperate with any one of all the other 184 States parties to the 
UNTOC is probably more than they can stomach politically. In this regard by signing the UNTOC 
they potentially opened a ‘Pandora’s toolbox’. The adoption of a formal review procedure for the 
UNTOC will enable a better picture of the performance of the UNTOC to facilitate effective 
cooperation against transnational organised crime. It might also provide more information about 
that more important ‘known unknown’: whether the UNTOC is having any real impression on 
transnational organised crime.  
 
